



Virtual Platform Based Development Environments for Low Power, Mixed Level Safety Critical System

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Acknowledgement:

This work was partially funded by the SAFEPower project under the EU Horizon2020 programme

<http://safepower-project.eu>

The authors give their thanks to all the organizations that participated in SAFEPower, both universities and commercial companies

The SAFEPower logo consists of the word "SAFEPower" in a bold, black, sans-serif font. The letter "A" is replaced by a yellow triangle with a black exclamation mark inside. The letter "O" is replaced by a yellow power button symbol (a circle with a vertical line and a semi-circle at the bottom).

Agenda



- Safety and security in embedded systems
- SAFEPOWER architecture
- Virtual platform environment
- SAFEPOWER platform: Xilinx Zynq 7000
- Virtual platform challenges and solutions
- Results
- Summary

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Safety and Security in Embedded Systems



- More processors per SoC is being driven by demand for bigger, faster, more efficient systems
- Initial architectures just consolidated smaller SoCs into a larger SoC with minimal sharing of resources
 - This satisfies performance and domain isolation (for safety and security critical uses) requirements
 - Power consumption becomes a real issue, in terms of reliability and cooling costs

Mixed Criticality Systems

- Definition: an embedded system comprised of hardware, operating system (OS), middleware services and application software with multiple levels of criticality
- Mixed criticality systems are seen in multiple market segments including automotive, avionics, industrial controls, medical electronics
- The architecture of many of these systems uses the OS and/or a hypervisor to realize partitioning between the domains with differing levels of criticality
 - In this situation, the OS or hypervisor implementing the partitioning needs to be certified at the same criticality level as the most critical application




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SAFEPOWER Reference Architecture

- SLP: Static Low-Power block
- PSI: Power Services Interface
- Hypervisor partitions for Power Monitoring App, User App #1, User App #2, ...
- Tile “partitions” for Bare-metal Tile #1, Bare-metal Tile #2, ...



SAFEPOWER Reference Architecture




- Tile-based architecture
- Connected via time-triggered Network on Chip (NoC)
- Tiles are managed by a Type-1 hypervisor
 - Allows for an arbitrary amount of user partitions
 - Low-Power Monitoring Partition: Special partition on the hypervisor for monitoring and controlling power management services
 - Includes time-triggered task management
- Bare-metal tiles are not directly managed by the hypervisor
 - Connected to the time-triggered NoC
 - Implements a light version of the hypervisor application interface
 - Time-triggered behavior is executed based on a pre-computed communication schedule that triggers the message injection times
- Achieves both the spatial isolation and temporal independence required in safety standards such as IEC-61508
- Time triggered architecture provides deterministic scheduling of software tasks, with Worst Case Execution Time (WCET) analysis supporting the achievement of timing requirements

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Imperas Environment for Embedded Software Development, Debug & Test



Virtual Platform



- Models
 - Existing models from the Open Virtual Platforms (OVP) Library used, if available
 - Models of Arm, MicroBlaze processors
 - Various non-processor models
 - New models built using OVP APIs as required
 - Network Interface (NI)
 - Various peripheral components
 - Hierarchical, parameterized platform
 - Models are open source (<http://www.ovpworld.org>)
- Simulator product is Imperas M*SDK
 - Instruction accurate simulator engine (~250 million instructions per second performance)
 - MultiProcessor Debugger (MPD) for platform-centric debug
 - Verification, Analysis and Profiling (VAP) tools

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


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SafePower Platform



- Objective was to build the platform as both real hardware and a virtual platform
- Based upon the Xilinx Zynq 7000 board
- Processing System (PS)
 - Static hardware block including ARM Cortex-A9MPx2 processor
- Programmable Logic (PL)
 - Define any components and interconnects
 - MicroBlaze processors
 - Network-on-Chip nodes and interconnect
 - Memory
 - Can create and dynamically load any PL definition
- Interconnect
 - Fixed Connectivity between PS and PL
 - Address-mapped data and GPIO
- Power Control and Monitor
 - Power monitoring devices
 - Set voltages and obtain feedback of current values
 - Clock control
 - Dynamically change processor clock frequency – Dynamic Voltage and Frequency Scaling (DVFS)

Hypervisor is XtratuM from FentISS



- Supports time-triggered task management
- Supports special partitions for system-level apps such as power monitoring and management


Xilinx Zynq Virtual Platform Hierarchy



Interchangeable Zynq Programmable Logic Modules

- Not Fully Modeled
- Artifact

SafePower Virtual Platform NoC



◄◄◄ NoC (Packetnet Network)

Agenda




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Virtual Platform Challenges




- 1) How to model DVFS
- 2) Fault injection testing environment
- 3) Support for time-triggered system

1) DVFS Implementation Uses Power Intercept Library



Virtual Power Sensor

- **Power Sensor** is represented by an intercepted I²C interface
- **Power Model** gets new voltage values and returns power values
- **That means:** Next to the frequency configuration the application is able to configure the voltages and to request the present power values



Executing Linux in VP with Attached Power Model



- Virtual Platform (VP) executes Linux and Power Model recognizes changes:
 - Core frequencies are reconfigured to 333MHz
 - RAM frequency is configured to 533MHz
- Power Model reconfigures MIPS rate of both cores

```
Freeing unused kernel memory: 256K (c06dc000 - c071c000)
This root FS contains most basic linux utilities (implemented with busybox)
and the Lynx web browser.
Kernel config is available through /proc/config.gz
Welcome to DVP simulation from Imperas
Log in as root with no password.
Imperas login: root
login[584]: root login on 'ttyPS0'
#

Warning (ARM_MP_WUMPRI) CPU 'Zyng/Zyng PS/cpu_CPU0': Write unimplemented MPCore register at offset 0x1384: ignored
Info (OFFIS PMo) @: 0.225096s, Core: 0, Write to ARM Frequency Register: 1f000400, new timer delta: 33300000
Info (OFFIS PMo) @: 0.225096s, Core: 0 at: 333MHz, derate factor: 50.075
Info (OFFIS PMo) @: 0.225096s, Core: 1 at: 333MHz, derate factor: 50.075
Info (OFFIS PMo) @: 0.22518s, Core: 0, Write to DDR Frequency Register: 18400003, at: 533MHz
Info (OFFIS PMo) @: 0.22521s, Core: 0, Write to DDR Frequency Register: 18400003, at: 533MHz
Info (OFFIS PMo) @: 0.229302s, Core: 0, Write to ARM Frequency Register: 1f000400, new timer delta: 33300000
Info (OFFIS PMo) @: 0.229302s, Core: 0 at: 333MHz, derate factor: 50.075
Info (OFFIS PMo) @: 0.229302s, Core: 1 at: 333MHz, derate factor: 50.075
Info (OFFIS PMo) @: 0.230391s, Core: 0, Write to ARM Frequency Register: 1f000400, new timer delta: 33300000
Info (OFFIS PMo) @: 0.230391s, Core: 0 at: 333MHz, derate factor: 50.075
Info (OFFIS PMo) @: 0.230391s, Core: 1 at: 333MHz, derate factor: 50.075
```

Linux Console and Simulator output

Core Frequencies

RAM Frequency

2) Fault Injection

- Fault injection framework should
 - Include different faults and fault campaigns
 - Apply simulation time to trigger injection of faults
- Faults implemented
 - Memory corruption
 - Memory monitoring and corruption
 - GPIO corruption
 - Switch partition scheduler
 - Reset CPUx
 - Uncontrolled interrupt

Fault Injection Execution Modes



- Intercept library
- Intercept library + configuration file
- Sequential execution of faults
- HTML based user interface

The screenshot shows the SAFEPower user interface with the following sections and annotations:

- SAFEPower** (Logo)
- Module processorExternalInterrupt**
 - Module: Zynq_PS
 - Time: 20.436
 - Instructions CPU0: 919022742
 - Instructions CPU1: 1840472279


Annotations: **Simulation Time** points to the Time field; **Instruction Count** points to the Instructions CPU0 field.
- Fault Injection Control**
 - Memory Fault Injection (OFF)
 - Memory Monitor/Fault Injection (OFF)
 - Change Hypervisor Scheduler (OFF)
 - Generate Unexpected Interrupt (OFF)
 - GPIO Fault Injector (OFF)
 - Reset CPU0 or CPU1 (OFF)

Annotation: **Faults** is a bracketed label pointing to this section.
- Stop Simulation**
 - Power button icon

Annotation: **End Simulation** points to the power button.

3) Simulation: Time-Triggered Scheduling

- Default simulation scheduler
 - Round-robin scheduling of processor execution
 - Functionally correct but limited timing reference
- SAFEPower is a time-triggered system
 - Timing synchronisation defined statically
 - Time triggers do not align with simulation quanta
- Solution: Develop time-triggered scheduler
 - Applications are executed until reach next event
 - Execution scheduled to complete “work”
 - Detect points in application for synchronisation events



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Evaluation




- Railway and avionics use cases implemented
- Evaluate the functionality and timing with and without low power techniques on both the virtual platform and hardware platform
- Objectives
 - Demonstrate that the software components interact correctly with each other and with the hardware
 - Verify that the entire system complies with the requirements – functional and extra-functional, also when including low power techniques – of the use case specification
 - Show that power savings can be reached for safety critical applications in different domains

SAFEPOWER Avionics Use Case



- Hypervisor partitions for Power Monitoring App, Maintenance Record System, ...
- Tile “partitions” for Actuators, Flight CTRL System, Flight CTRL System & LDU



Virtual Platform Results



- Virtual platform results were equivalent to hardware based results for the tests that could be run on both platforms
 - Virtual platform uses the same binaries, and so can be utilized in test and certification of safety critical applications
- Virtual platform provided benefits over the hardware platform for development, debug, analysis and verification of software applications
 - 1) Execution control: Simulation is deterministic
 - 2) Unified debug environment: Simultaneous debug of all application code executing on all processors in the platform, including access to peripherals
 - Analysis tools such as profiling, code coverage, dynamic assertions, etc. are implemented non-intrusively: no modification or instrumentation of source code required
 - Power Interface Library, implemented using Imperas SlipStreamer API (binary interception), enabled support for real time power management techniques such as DVFS within the virtual platform environment
 - 3) Fault injection: The virtual platform provides visibility and observability, so faults can be injected anywhere in the platform, e.g. memory, processor registers, ... Fault injection is implemented by an external library, so fault generation can be controlled

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Summary

- Virtual platform was used for development of mixed-criticality system
- Several challenges were encountered and overcome:
 - Power modeling for power monitoring and management
 - Fault injection testing
 - Support of time-triggered system
- Virtual platform environment had equivalent results to hardware platform, with a number of advantages due to the controllability, observability, determinism and ease of automation of the software simulation



Thank you

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